But for all these realities of PHE country dispersion, the country spread is far from uniform. Indeed, global PHE concentrates significantly in a set of countries. While PHE holds 33 percent of total global higher education taking its average as a mean, its median by country is 20 percent. Just three countries-India, the United States, and Brazil-hold over 40 percent of global PHE. In fact, 17 different combinations of just three countries (always including India) aggregate to a third of global PHE. On the other hand, whereas one can be struck by just any three countries holding such a high share of global PHE, the reality that 17 different combinations exist could also be taken as some further evidence of relative dispersion across countries.
The most robust manifestation of the country concentration of PHE is how much it clusters in large higher education systems. Of course, we might well expect some correlation between total and PHE enrollment. The world's largest 10 systems (the only ones with over 3 million enrollments) do hold an impressive 58 percent of total global enrollment-but they hold 69 percent of global private enrollment. Choosing the largest 10 countries by private enrollment rather than by total enrollment would raise the private share by only 2 percent. Indeed, nine of the top 10 countries would remain the same, while the Philippines would replace Turkey. In descending order, the 10 largest private enrollment sectors are in India, the United States, Brazil, China, Japan, Indonesia, South Korea, Iran, the Philippines, and Russia. Six of these have private sectors larger than their public sectors. Whereas Asian countries are the majority on this top 10 list, Latin American countries are the majority in the next 10.
This last observation suggests that alongside the country concentration of PHE lies regional concentration, a topic for another occasion. What the present article shows is that global PHE's country configuration features a combination of significant dispersion across systems alongside significant concentration in large higher education systems. It leads to the closing of minds, the undermining of knowledge production, and a limited ability of universities to bring about social change. The exception to this dominant model in the Arab world is Tunisia, which, not coincidentally, has also been the only exception to the failure of the "Arab Spring," continuing on the path of democracy and progressive reform despite some setbacks.
The Political Model
An edited volume recently published in Beirut recounts the historical development of 10 Arab public universities-the oldest in each country-from their inception until 2016. It shows that the typical Arab public university fell under a political model of governance, mostly in the 1970s, moving away from the Napoleonic model used previously. This Napoleonic model references the French system established by Napoleon Bonaparte (1769-1821), in which higher education is centralized (state oriented), secular, and provided in distinct professionally and academically oriented schools apart from research institutes (which are also centralized).
For example, in 1977, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat issued a law prohibiting political activity at Egyptian universities. Based on this law, security agents began setting up checkpoints at the entrances of university buildings and intervening in university decisions. In fact, Sadat revived the strong legacy of control familiar in the Nasser era (1953) (1954) (1955) (1956) (1957) (1958) (1959) (1960) (1961) (1962) (1963) (1964) (1965) (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) (1970) period, Egyptian public universities witnessed a decline in the international exchange of students and academics. Concomitantly, the "borrowing system" of Egyptian professors by Gulf countries accelerated after the oil crisis of 1973. To increase the number of senior professors sent abroad, the provision of local PhD graduates increased, leading to a sort of inbreeding in academia. Furthermore, the "borrowed" faculty, subjected to the conservative atmosphere of their host countries, returned home as nouveaux riches and contented with the status quo.
Damascus University in Syria came under both security control and the influence of the political ideology of the ruling Ba'ath party. While the security system required academics to be "silent"-their academic freedom curtailed-they were also asked to speak the language of the Ba'ath Party. This began in the 1970s, when a branch of the party was established at Damascus University with offices in various colleges and departments. A decree, issued in 1970, transformed the Teachers' Union (an independent body established in 1935) into a "popular organization" that included all civil servants in the ministries of education and higher education. This organization was affiliated with the Ba'ath Party. As for the students, they were affiliated with the "Student Union Executive Office," which was part of the "National Union of Syrian Students," in turn affiliated with the Ba'ath Party. All this took place in accordance with the Law on the Prevention of Political Activity at the university.
The situation in Libyan public universities is similar to Syria, with a further touch of surrealism. Instead of the Ba'ath ideology, it drew on the Third World revolutionary ideology professed in the Green Book (1975) of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, who ruled the country between 1969 and 2011. The process started in 1973 with the country's Cultural Revolution, during which Gaddafi declared the "abolition of all the laws in force, clearing the country of perverts," and promising "no freedom to the country's enemies." Cooperating with the intelligence services, the country's Revolutionary Committees expelled faculty, deans, and university presidents. Gaddafi himself went to Benghazi University in order to push the process forward, giving speeches and leading rallies aimed at eliminating opposition figures. According to available sources, he attended the execution, at the university's central square, of students who were considered enemies of the people, carried out by student members of Revolutionary Committees. After Gaddafi, universities went through the same process again, but in reverse, with the elimination of anyone accused of having collaborated with Gaddafi.
Similar observations of politicized university governance-each with its own peculiarities-could be made at the University of Sanaa in Yemen, the Lebanese University, Khartoum University in Sudan, Kuwait University, and the University of Jordan. Among the Gulf States, the case of Sultan Qaboos University in Oman, founded in 1986, shows a distinctive version of the political model of governance: a paternalistic one. The university is under the protection and care of the sultan and conservative values are dominant; from its inception, this has inhibited intellectual openness and encouraged self-censorship.
The Tunisian exception
Public universities in Tunisia appear atypical. They remain closer to the Napoleonic model. Unlike the Syrian Ba'ath Party, the Tunisian ruling political party, the Constitutional Liberal Party (Destour) is no ideological party; it is an elite party with a popular base. It incorporates members from a variety of intellectual backgrounds, including leftists; indeed, former President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali appointed a member of the left, Mohamed Charfi, as minister of education (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) .
The differences between the Tunisian case and others in the region are significant enough to be explanatory regarding the varied outcomes of the so-called Arab Spring. The first difference concerns intellectual openness. The University of Tunis was, and remains, open to the French university system in its curricula, organization, and intellectual resources. French books, newspapers, television, and other media are part of Tunisian culture and university life, even influencing the Islamic Ennahda Party. The second difference relates to the selection of university leadership. An election system was introduced by law in 2011 and consolidated afterwards-unlike in Egypt, where it was legislated following the 2011 revolution, but subsequently annulled. The third difference is the legacy of syndicalism. A union for higher education and scientific research was established in 1967 and joined the Tunisian Labor Union, which had been in existence since 1946, preceding the country's independence from French rule in 1956. The Higher Education Union expanded in the 1980s, as a reaction to the shift toward economic liberalism in the country.
The political model of governance is likely to transform T oday's world is faced with a severe forced migration crisis. The recent Annual Global Trends Report by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UN-HCR) indicates that a person becomes a forced migrant every two seconds. The current number of forced migrants worldwide is 68.5 million. These forced migrants include established scholars as well as undergraduate and graduate students whose education has been interrupted by forces outside of their control. They are knocking on the doors of universities in different parts of the world. Some are being heard, others are being ignored. Universities and governments should remember how significantly forced immigrant scholars and students have contributed to national research and development and institutional quality in the past, including, for example, Jewish scholars who fled to the United States from Nazi Germany.
A recent report by the UNHCR, Left Behind: Refugee Education in Crisis, reveals that the ratio of refugee youth studying at a university is 1 percent, which is far lower than the global enrollment rate in higher education of 36 percent. It is extremely disappointing that national governments and individual institutions have not acted more quickly to assist the large mass of displaced people in accessing education-in line with Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights-thereby recognizing this as a human right. There have been some promising efforts, but these efforts have not been evenly spread across the developed and the developing world. According to the Annual Global Trends Report of the UNHCR, 85 percent of the refugees under the UNHCR's mandate, who have been forcibly displaced as a result of conflict, violence, or persecution, are hosted by countries in the developing world. The challenges faced by these countries in responding to a global problem on their doorstep requires further attention, as the case of Turkey illustrates.
Syrian Refugees in Turkish Universities
Currently, Turkey hosts over 3.6 million Syrian refugees, the highest number hosted by any country. As the war in Syria is ongoing, and assuming therefore that it will host Syrian refugees for a long time, the Turkish government has repositioned itself by strategically internationalizing three functions of Turkish universities.
In order to help Syrian refugees access universities as students, the Turkish government has reformed academic and financial admission policies. Universities have been required to admit Syrian refugees without proof of previous academic qualification as "special students," and those who do have proof as "regular students." In addition, Arabictaught programs have been established at eight universities in southern Turkey, close to the Syrian border. Financial policies have been changed to provide Syrian refugees with government scholarships and exemption from tuition fees paid by other international students. The result has been a dramatic increase in the number of Syrian students enrolled in Turkish universities, from 608 in 2011 to 20,701 in 2018, as reported by the Council of Higher Education (CoHE).
The strategic internationalization efforts of the Turkish government have also targeted potential academics among Syrian refugees. In 2016, an online platform, the Database for International Academics, was established to collect curricula vitae. This resulted in increased numbers of Syrian academics working in Turkey. According to the CoHE, the number of full-time Syrian academics has increased from 292 to 348 in the last three years. In addition, in the same period, masters and doctoral programs admitted 1,492 and 404 Syrian refugees respectively.
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